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allow recovery in such a case where an apparent injustice is without
substantive basis. Any wrong suffered by plaintiff has been at the hands
of the agent, and any feelings of inequity which may accompany the
IngalIS2 4 decision will be mitigated in light of plaintiff's cause of action
against the agent.25
In conclusion, this decision, which limits an insurance agent's ap-
parent authority, rests on sound principles of agency and contract law.
PAUL J. CLULO
Charitable Immunity: Prior Abrogation of the Doctrine of Char-
itable Immunity Application to Churches-Plaintiff, a member of
defendant church, tripped over a permanently extended kneeler and was
injured. In a suit against the church, the court in re-examining the doc-
trine of immunity as applied to religious institutions, found the doctrine
of respondeat superior applicable to the defendant church.' t.
In Wisconsin prior to 1962, three. institutions enjoyed immunity
from the torts of their employees-governmental, charitable, and, re-
ligious. Of the five theories available on whic'h to, base this immunity,2
Wisconsin's rule was based on the inapplicability of respondeat superior
to these institutions. The immunity rule was first expressed in Morrison
v. Henke,3 . in which the defendant hospital was found immune from
liability for the negligence of its nurse because it derived no profit in
aiding the needy.4 This immunity was applied in .favor of the govern-
ment in Apfelbacher v. State,5 where it was pointed out. that to deny
the-application Qf .respondeat superior to the state.in its exerciseof a
24 Ibid.
25 See, Note, Liabilit, of an Insurance Agent for Malpractice, 11 IC6.q L. :REv.
184 (1962), and Note, Liability of an Insurance Agent in Procuring and
Maintaining Insurance for aii Owne7', 12 VAND. L. Riv. 839 (1939).
1 Widell v- Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W. 2d 249
(1963).
2Parks v. Norfhwestern University, 218 111. '381, 75 N.E. 991 (1905)- (The
trust fund theory); Cohen v. General Hosp. Soc., 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl.
435 (1931) (public policy theory); Taylor v. Protestant Hosp. Assn:, 85
Ohio St. -90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911) (inapplicability of respondeat superior);
Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 59 Idaho 3502, 82 P. 2d 849(1938) (waiver theory) ; University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564,
106 S.W. 219 (1907) (agencies of the government theory).
3165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W. 173 (1917), followed in Schumacher v. Evangelical
Deaconness Society, 218 Wis. 169, 260 N.W. 476 (1935).
4Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 170, 170 N.W. 173, 175 (1917): "The
maxim of respondeat superior is bottomed on this principle, that he who
expects to derive advantage from an act which is done by another for him
must answer for any injury which a third party may sustain from it."
5 160 Wis. 565, 575, 152 N.W. 144, 147 (1915): "The doctrine of respondeat
superior, while an ancient one in English law, is not one that rests upon
direct primary principles of justice. These principles require that the person
actually committing the wrong should alone respond in damages. The doctrine
rests rather upon secondary principles deduced from primary conceptions
of justice. It rests upon the idea that where an enterprise is carried on for
the financial benefit of a master, it is considered just that he should answer
for the tort of his servant in conducting it because he is deemed to profit
financially by its being carried on."
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governmental function is not to deny an injured person a remedy, for the
cause of action still exists against the person who actually committed
the wrong. Bachman v. Y.M.C.A. 7 extended the immunity to religious
institutions where the court enunciated the policy reasons for the rule."
Immunity has been explained as a doctrine which absolves from
liability a defendant otherwise liable for tortious conduct in order to
protect the interests which he represents.9 The refusal to apply respon-
deat superior to charities has been criticized on the premise that be-
cause they control their employees, and control is the basis of the doc-
trine, they should be liable regardless of their financial profit from the
enterprise. In considering this argument, it becomes apparent that public
policy is inextricably involved with the immunity doctrine. Thus once
it has been decided that immunity should exist for the public good, the
control factor as a basis of liability becomes irrelevant.
The first departure from the policy of immunity occurred in the
case of President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes,0
which attacked the trust fund theory stating that insurance was avail-
able to guard against dissipation of the fund."' The insurance factor
became more emphatically a basis of liability in Pierce v. Yakima Valley
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n. where the court quoting from the Georgetown
College case said:
61d. at 576, 152 N.W. at 148: "The application of the doctrine of respondeat
superior to the state when exercising a governmental function doesn't leave
a person injured remediless. He has his cause of action against the person
or persons actually committing the wrong.... It merely refuses to extend
the master's liability to cases where he does not profit by the enterprise he
is engaged in, ..."
7 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922).
8 Id. at 180, 191 N.W. at 752: "The fundamental reason why a charitable organ-
ization should not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior
is not based upon any situation that the injured person may occupy toward
the charitable corporation, but upon the inherent and well recognized dis-
tinction between such charitable corporations, organized as they are with the
primary and principal purpose of assisting the sick, unfortunate or needy or
other instances of deserving humanity, and without provision for or expect-
ance of receiving financial returns for such particular service, compared
with corporations which are primarily and principally organized for or in
expectation of private gain."
9 PR0SsR, ToRTs §108, at 1063 (1st ed. 1941).
10 130 F. 2d 810 (1942).
11 Id. at 814: ". . . if there is danger of dissipation, insurance is now available
to guard against it and prudent management will provide the protection. It
is highly doubtful that any substantial charity would be destroyed or donation
deterred by the cost required to pay the premiums. While insurance should
not, perhaps, be made a criterion of responsibility, its prevalence and low cost
are important considerations in evaluating the fears, or supposed ones,
of dissipation or deterrence. The rule of immunity is out of step with the
general trend of legislative and judicial policy in distributing losses incurred
by individuals through the operation of an enterprise among all who benefit
by it rather than in leaving them wholly to be borne by those who sustain
them."
12 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765, 770 (1953) : "We realize of course, that not
all present day hospitals are large and well-financed, and that there are some
hospitals today which render a great deal of gratuitous service. This is
especially true of church-maintained institutions . . .nor do we overlook the
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What is at stake, so far as the charity is concerned is the cost
of reasonable protection, the amount of the insurance premiums
as an added burden on its .finances, not the awarding over in
damages of its entire assets.13
The policy reason for the decision was that: "It is a principle of law,
as well as of morals, that men must be just before they are gen-
erous... ."14
In the same year the Pierce decision was rendered, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court stated in Baldwin v. St. Peter's Congregation1 that
any alteration of the doctrine of charitable immunity was for the legis-
lature to make, for "(I)t is peculiarly within the province of the legis-
lature to determine questions of public policy."' 6 The court's dissatis-
faction with the rule, however, was seen in cases which circumvented
it on a nuisance theory,' 7 leading to the statement in Widell that:
. . . it is inconsistent and illogical to hold a religious institution
liable for nuisance and in some cases for a breach of a standard
of care greater than common-law negligence and yet grant im-
munity for the same acts or breach of a lesser degree of care un-
der the label of common-law negligence.' 8
The Widell decision was based on violation of the safe-place statute 9
(the "standard greater than common-law negligence" in the above
quotation) which removed certain aspects of charitable operation from
the protection of the immunity rule. This statute has been construed as
imposing a broader duty on an employer with regard to the public place,
and a narrower duty on the owner of it.2° This statute would seem to
fact that the principles with which we are dealing have application also to
such organizations as Y.M.C.A.'s, Y.W.C.A.'s, and Red Cross. Such organiza-
tions have benefitted much less than hospitals from changed economic condi-
tions and social outlook.... The public policy with which we are here con-
cerned, however, must be based upon general conditions and the average
situation."
'3 Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, id., 260 P. 2d at 771 quoting
President and Directors of Georgetown College, 130 F. 2d 810 (1942).
14 Ibid.
15 264 Wis. 626, 60 N.W. 2d 343 (1953).1id. at 631, 60 N.W. 2d at 352: "Since [1922] the question has been approached
in one way or another, but the conclusion has always been that the legislature
of this state, in the exercise of its constitutional powers, altered the rule of
charitable immunity but to a limited extent only, when a charitable institution
owning a public building was required to construct, repair and maintain
such public building so as to render the same safe .... It is peculiarly within
the province of the legislature to determine questions of public policy."17 Smith v. Congregation of St. Rose, 265 Wis. 393, 61 N.W. 2d 397 (1957).is Widell v. Holy Trinity Church, supra note 1, at 655, 121 N.W. 2d at 253.
19 Wis. STAT. §§101.01, 101.06 (1961).
20 Baldwin v. St. Peter's Congregation, 264 Wis. 626, 628, 60 N.W. 2d 349, 350(1953) : "The employer has a broad duty with respect to structures and also
with reference to devices and other property installed. The obligation of the
owner of a public building, however, is to construct, repair or maintain it so
as to render it safe . . . and relates to the building, not to temporary condi-




indicate the legislature's views as to the extent the immunity doctrine
should be abrogated, and therefore one would think that the Baldwin
decision would controll the Widell situation, but instead the court justi-
fies total abrogation of the doctrine by stating "that they (religious or-
ganizations) already have liability for acts of higher degrees of negli-
gence under the safe-place statute and for nuisances which liability they
can and have in many cases minimized" by insurance." 2'
In less than ten years from its reaffirmation of the immunity doc-
trine, the court made a complete about-face in Kojis v. Doctor's Hos-
pital,2 2 holding that charitable hospitals are liable to paying patients for
the negligence of their employees for the reason that hospitals "are now
larger in size, better endowed, 'and on a more sound economic basis."
Governmental immunity was abrogated in Holytz v. City of Milwau-
kee23 and held to apply "broadly 'to torts, whether they be by com-
mission or omission" and to relate to "all public bodies within the
state ... ." The application of the Holytz reasoning was made pros-
pective -to July 15, 1962, but it was applied before that time in Marshall
v. Green Bay24 because of the fact that the city carried liability in-
surance by which it "waived its immunity. '25 A thought provoking
dissent pointed out that a defendant, otherwise not liable, became re-
sponsible because he purchased insurance; this is in direct contrast with
the purpose of insurance-that the person who buys it does so to pro-
tect himself in the event he is found to be responsible.
The most cogent objection to the abrogation of immunity was ex-
pressed in the dissenting opinion of Justice Hill in the Pierce case:
The courts were not intended as policy making bodies, and their
limitations for the exercise of such a function are readily ap-
parent. They act retroactively and without notice to any but the
litigants; the legislature acts only prospectively and after all
interested parties have had, an opportunity to be heard.... After
hearing only the litigants on a matter which affects directly or
indirectly, hundreds of charitable organizations, and of which
they have had no notice, the majority does what the legislature
would not be permitted to do, i.e. change the 'public policy of the
state ex post facto.28
Since the Widell decision, the immunity of parents from the tort
claims of their children against them has been abrogated,2 7 and the next
21 Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, supra note 1, at 656, 121 N.W. 2d
at 254.
22 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d 131, 107 N.W. 2d 292 (1961).
23 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W. 2d 618 (1962).
24 18 Wis. 2d 496 118 N.W. 2d 715 (1963)."
25 Id. at 501, 118 .W. 2d at 718.
26 Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Assn, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d
765,775 (1953).
27 Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, -N.W. 2d- (1963).
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logical conclusion is that eleemosynary educational institutions will no
longer be immune from liability.
The court, it seems, sees the availability of insurance as a panacea
for the suffering of those injured by accidents, and this without any
investigation by court or counsel as to the ability of religious institu-
tions in particular to finance insurance coverage. This writer questions
whether this type of decision reflects a trend in the law to minimize the
negligence factor in a move toward strict liability.
MARGARET M. HUFF
Municipal Immunity: Purchase of Liability Insurance by a
Municipality Waives Immunity-In the recent case of Marshall v. City
of Green Bay,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the city's pur-
chase of a liability policy in which the insurer renounced the defense of
governmental immunity constituted a waiver by the city of municipal
immunity for the tortious acts of its employees.
The action was brought by the injured wife and her husband and
involved injuries sustained by the wife while tobogganing on a toboggan
hill operated by the city outside of the corporate limits of Green Bay.
The injured wife was thrown from the toboggan when it hit a rough
area consisting of frozen hummocks. It was alleged that the city was
negligent in allowing the rough area to exist and in not warning users
of the hill of the danger.
Plaintiffs sued the city after disallowance of their claim by the
common council. The city carried insurance covering any liability for
its operation, supervision and maintenance of the toboggan hill. The
policy provided that the insurance company should be notified and should
defend any action on the policy at its own expense and could not claim
that the city was free from liability because of the performance of
governmental functions. It further provided that no action could be
brought against the insurer unless the amount of the city's obligation
to pay were first determined either by a judgment against the city after
trial or by a written agreement between the city, the claimant and the
insurer.
The city demurred to the complaint, and the trial court delayed
ruling on the demurrer to await the decision in the pending case of
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee.2 After the Holytz decision which abol-
ished municipal immunity prospectively, the trial court sustained the
city's demurrer and the plaintiffs appealed. On appeal plaintiffs con-
tended that their complaint stated a cause of action because:
(1) They were as diligent in pursuing their claims and in chal-
lenging governmental immunity as were the plaintiffs in Holytz
I Marshall v. City of Green Bay, 18 Wis. 2d 496, 118 N.W. 2d 715 (1963).
2 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W. 2d 618 (1962).
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